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Introduction
Abstract
De-industrialization was accelerated by the 2008-2009 crisis in most high income countries. Yet the trend
began decades earlier, as comparative advantage of emerging economies shifted towards more
advanced goods and their growing populations commanded an increasing share in global demand. This
shift towards a factory-free economy in high income countries has drawn the attention of policy makers in
North America and Europe. Some politicians have articulated alarming views, initiating mercantilist or
beggar thy neighbor cost-competitiveness policies. Yet companies like Apple, which concentrates
research and design innovations at home but no longer has any factories in the United States, may be the
norm in the future.
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De-industrialization was accelerated by the 2008-2009 crisis in most high income countries. Yet
the trend began decades earlier, as comparative advantage of emerging economies shifted towards more
advanced goods and their growing populations commanded an increasing share in global demand. This
shift towards a factory-free economy in high income countries has drawn the attention of policy makers
in North America and Europe. Some politicians have articulated alarming views, initiating mercantilist
or beggar thy neighbor cost-competitiveness policies. Yet companies like Apple, which concentrates
research and design innovations at home but no longer has any factories in the United States, may be
the norm in the future.
This ongoing transformation of the industrial economies may be consistent with evolving comparative advantage, but has significant short run costs and requires far-sighted investments. These include
the costs to workers who are caught in the shift from an industrial to a service economy, and the need
to invest in new infrastructure and education to prepare coming generations for their changing roles.
A conference held in Paris aimed at providing an economic analysis of this phenomenon. A selection
of the papers presented has been chosen as a starting point of this book. Since then, authors have revised their papers, prolonged their research, refined their conclusions and drafted stimulating chapters.
We ended up with 11 contributions complementing each other and tackling the problem from different
angles.
Richard Baldwin starts off the volume by dividing global forces for trade and industrialization into
two historical periods.

In the first period, which he refers to as “globalization’s first unbundling”,

falling transport costs and freer trade allowed the industrial countries to rapidly industrialize and dominate manufacturing. From the industrial revolution through the early 1980s, rich countries benefited
5
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from a virtual cycle of innovation, agglomeration, and increasing competitiveness in manufacturing.
Manufacturing wage increases were more than offset by productivity increases, and G7 nations saw
their share of world GDP soar from a fifth in 1920 to two-thirds by 1990. Baldwin attributes most of
the impetus to globalization during this first unbundling to improvements in transport, which radically
lowered transport costs and allowed countries to exploit scale economies and comparative advantage.
With agglomeration, cities grew in size and the North industrialized while the South de-industrialized.
Beginning sometime between 1985 and 1995, according to Baldwin, this trend reversed. This is
the so-called “second unbundling”, when the nature of globalization changed and led to the upheaval
which is the focus of our book. Baldwin zeroes in on the ICT revolution as the driver of this change,
as telecommunications became cheaper and more reliable. The ICT revolution was accompanied by
the increasing integration into the global economy of a small number of developing countries, which
rapidly increased their share of global manufacturing as well as global GDP. While the first unbundling
made it easier to buy and sell goods internationally, according to Baldwin “the ICT revolution changed
this.

High-tech firms found it profitable to combine their firm-specific know-how with low-wage

labour in developing nations”. European firms could now combine their manufacturing technology
with labor outside of Europe.
Baldwin describes the changing nature of globalization as shifting the drivers from lower transport
costs and tariffs which made it possible to concentrate production and exports in the north, to ICT
innovations which allow manufacturing to be dispersed and sent to the south. He also introduces
the concept of “smile curve economics”, first proposed by Acer founder Stan Shih, whereby the share
of who appropriates value-added follows a so-called smile: high at the design phase, lower during
the manufacturing phase, and high again in the distribution phase.

He points out that the smile

“deepened” during the second unbundling, as manufacturing’s share in value-added has fallen with
industrialization in the south.
What does all this imply for manufacturing jobs in Europe? Baldwin paradoxically concludes that
while industrial country manufacturing firms are likely to retain a leading role, manufacturing jobs in
the north will continue to decline. Industrial country firms will continue to extract a large share of
value-added through their role in product design and research and development, as well as sales, marketing and after sales services, and will contract out or oversee manufacturing in the “south”. While
some manufacturing jobs will remain at home, they will more likely be the high skill intensive jobs.
While value-added may remain in industrial countries, it is unlikely that this will bring more factory
jobs. These shifts will support the ever-increasing importance of cities, which Baldwin concludes “are
to the 21st century what factories were to the 20th century. Urban policy will be the new industrial
policy.”
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The bottom line is that there is nothing like a traditional factory in the twenty-first century. Tasks
have been split according to Adam Smith’s view of the pin factory, but thanks to digitization at the
global level. This has led to a dramatic reshaping of tasks maintained in the high level economies.
Growth is now fueled by talents and their agglomeration. Services and industry are one and the same
thing, and if there is something like a factory, this is now the big city where talents, ideas and services
can be combined. Hence the economic competition between agglomerations and the related policies
to support their development. The big challenge, from a macroeconomic perspective is the induced
disconnection between the creation of value added and the creation of jobs. Although the other face
of this coin is productivity gains, distributional issues will become increasingly relevant in advanced
economies as value is now shaped by intangible assets.
Japan is certainly one of the most affected of the advanced economies: specialization in electronic
equipment, scarcity of resources, and offshoring to low cost locations for most industrial tasks combine
here in a large shock to the domestic industry. Japan’s hollowing out is the focus of the second chapter
of the book, co-authored by Michael Ryan and Farid Toubal. Ryan and Toubal analyze a unique dataset
following Japanese firms between 1982 and 2001. Their data allows them to identify whether Japanese
multinational firms were responsible for the hollowing out of the economy in shifting manufacturing
jobs abroad.
Ryan and Toubal focus on the so-called lost decade which followed Japan’s economic collapse in
1991.

They begin by documenting that an enormous expansion in Japanese multinational activity

began around that time. The number of Japanese multinationals jumped by 290 % between 1985 and
1992, and continued to rise at a slower pace after that. While Japanese overseas production was just
over 3 % in 1982, it increased by five fold over the next twenty years to reach 17.1 % in 2002. Ryan and
Toubal also document that over these decades Japanese multinational firms reallocated their networks
from North America to Asia and Europe. The share of Japanese vertical affiliates (located in a different
business line than their parents) more than doubled in these two regions while it halved in North
America.
The aggregate employment data for Japanese multinationals is strongly suggestive of a hollowing out. Between 1997 and 2012, for the manufacturing sector as a whole Japanese parents reduced
domestic employemnt by almost 3 %. While employment in Japan shrank in most sectors, Japanese
multinationals expanded employment abroad. Econometric evidence confirms that Japanese multinationals contracted domestic employment post 1991, although over the entire two decades the effect
is surprisingly small and insignificant. This is partly because other Japanese companies also experienced employment stagnation, so that in comparison Japanese multinationals do not appear to engage
in significant hollowing out.

Comparied to non-multinationals, Japanese MNCs reduced domestic
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employment by 0.17 % per year from 1992 to 2001, mostly in vertically-organized firms.
Ryan and Toubal conclude that there is only limited evidence of hollowing out of the Japanese
economy by Japanese MNEs moving production abroad.

They hypothesize that the limited effect

on domestic employment of outward Japanese MNE activity could be due to the well-known lifetime
employment policies adopted by many Japanese firms. Since their formal analysis stops in 2001, it is
also possible that the negative effects accelerated after that period, as suggested by their tables showing
signficant employment reallocation between 2001and 2012.
An alternative way to think about the de-industrialization in rich countries documented in the first
two chapters of the book is through the concept of structural transformation. Recent databases on
trade in value added show that goods trade cannot easily be distinguished from services trade, and the
more so for advanced economies. This mirrors the shift from manufacture to services which has been
documented by Hollis Chenery and Moises Syrquin, among others. As income per capita increases,
there is a shift in the sectoral structure of the value added, employment and consumption patterns.
All in all, the shift in value terms is magnified, compared to evolutions of value added in volume. But
the implied reduction in the labor share (as labor shifts towards less productive sectors) is at odds
with a balanced growth path combining a constant growth rate of real per-capita output, a constant
capital-output ratio and a constant labor income share over time.
Jean Imbs in his chapter describes this structural transformation taking place in OECD countries.
He documents that deindustrialization of rich economies is accelerating, as labor moves away from
industrial sectors. Imbs notes that “this reallocation is taking center stage in political circles, where
calls for industrial policy, rising regulation or protectionism are heard increasingly loudly.”
Imbs documents the main features of structural change in 15 OECD countries since 1970. He identifies that deindustrialization began in the OECD in the 1980’s, but only in terms of changes in the
allocation of labor, not the allocation of value added. Beginning in the mid-1980s, employment shares
decreased in manufacturing, and increased in services. Imbs measures the changes in sectoral shares
over four decades. He finds that on average, employment shares in manufacturing have declined by
1.7 percent per year since 1970, whereas employment shares in services have increased by 1.3 percent
per year. Measured in terms of employment per se, manufacturing employment fell by 1.23 percent per
year while services employment increased by 1.82 percent. But the same is not true of the sector allocation of value added. In particular, between 1970 and 2011, the share of manufacturing in value added
does not display any significant trend. As labor productivity rose more quickly than elsewhere, this
actually also translated in higher wage growth for manufactures than for services. The reallocation
of employment away from manufacturing is consistent with Baumol’s (1967) view that sectors with
relatively high productivity growth lose employment.
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Imbs finds that for the OECD countries, the share of the manufacturing sector in value added exhibited no clear downward trend between 1970 and 2011, whereas the share of services increased. This is
quite different from the conventional view going back to Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin (1986), where
the reallocation goes from manufactures to services. Falling employment in manufacturing but stable
value-added shares are associated with rising productivity and wages in the manufacturing sector. As
Imbs points out, “de-industrialization would not be apparent just on output data”, which “suggests quite
some resilience in industrial production.”
Imbs also unpacks the trends within both manufacturing and services. While light industries fell
precipitously, the share of heavy industries (including metals, metal products, machinery, equipment,
and transport equipment) actually increased as a share of value added. In services, the number one
recipient of employment was administrative services, and the star in terms of output gains was ICT–
where employment, value added and productivity growth all increased.
Examining changes in structural transformation between 1970 and 2011, Imbs makes three additional observations.

First, de-industrialization did not begin until the mid-1980s, and the share of

manufacturing value-added remained roughly constant until the year 2000, when deindustrialization
accelerated. We note in passing that the precipitious decline in manufacturing around this period has
been noted by others, particularly Justin Pierce and Peter Schott, who associate it with China’s entry
into the WTO in late 2001.
Second, Imbs notes that the share of construction in value-added contracted somewhat in the 1990s
but accelerated following the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Finally, services has both accelerated its share
in GDP and its share in employment, with the result that employment is being drawn to the lowest
productivity sector.

Imbs concludes his chapter by noting that one reason why “structural change

is back with a vengeance in policy conversations” is that post-2000 output shares of manufacturing in
value-added in the OECD finally declined. In the last six years of his sample, both labor and output
shares collapsed simultaneously in heavy manufactures.

It was not until the 2000s, and the great

recession, that manufacturing output shares collapsed across all sectors in the OECD.
Whatever the mechanisms at play, the next chapter in this book suggests that the shift from industry to services is to some extent a matter of definition. In the words of Matthieu Crozet and Emmanuel
Milet, “the frontier between manufacturing and services is quite blurry.” How do we define an industry? Does one refer to large scale production, increasing returns, new consumption items increasingly
affordable to the consumer? Taking such a broad view, many services could compare with industries.
And even within manufacturing industry in the usual sense, services represent an increasing share of
the value added. The shift towards services within the manufacturing sector is known as the “servitization” of the manufacturing sector.
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Crozet and Milet document the importance of the servitization of French manufacturing firms over
the 1997-2007 period, by looking at their supply of services. They define servitization as the increase
in the share of services in the firms’ production sales. They have a database of about 635,000 French
manufacturing firms, which allows them to identify trends in the percentage of services produced and
sold within manufacturing firms during the time period.
While most of the literature on deindustrialization focuses on the types of shifts from industry to
services documented in the chapters by Jean Imbs and Richard Baldwin, Crozet and Milet show that
these same trends are very much present within French firms themselves. They document a moderate,
but signicant and steady trend of servitization over the period. They also decompose the trend into
between and within firm changes, and find that servitization is mainly driven by changes that occur
within firms. By the end of their sample period, in 2007, they document that 83 % of manufacturing
firms sold some services, 40 % sold more services than goods, and 26 % did not even produce goods.
There are both positive and negative implications of the chapter by Milet and Crozet. One the one
hand, taking servitization into account provides a harsher diagnosis about the deindustrialisation of
the French economy. Milet and Crozet estimate that the decline in the proportion of workers involved
in the production of goods has been up to 8% higher than the usual measures of deindustrialization
based on the proportion of workers employed in manufacturing firms. On the other hand, Milet and
Crozet argue that this kind of within firm shift towards services has a much more benign and likely
beneficial impact on workers than the intersectoral shifts occuring at the macro level.

While job

losses in manufacturing and job creation in services sectors in the aggregate industrial economies are
creating large social costs,the services provided by manufacturing firms are quite different.

These

services–think of an Apple or a Rolls Royce–are typically strongly linked to the product they sell.
Crozet and Milet optimistically conclude that “this strong complementarity is likely to support the
sales of manufacturing products and to defend manufacturing employment and enhance productivity.”
From a statistical point of view, a redefinition of sectors and activities is needed as soon as manufacturing firms perform services. In contrast, some firms are outside the manufacturing sector according to
official government statistics but nonetheless are heavily involved in the production of manufactured
goods. Although not actually producing such goods, how do we classify firms like Apple designing
and selling products without factories ? Bernard and Fort refer to these firms as "Factoryless Goods
Producers" and document their importance using US census data.
Bernard and Fort shift the focus outside of manufacturing to examine the importance of factoryless
goods producers, or FGPs for short, defined as firms classified as part of the wholesale trade sector
but that “design the goods they sell and coordinate the production activites.”

In their words, these

FGPs are “manufacturing-like” in the sense that they might take a product from the concept through
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production and delivery but do not actually engage in the production themselves. Examples of such
companies include Apple, Mindspeed Technologies (a fabless semiconductor company), and the British
appliance firm Dyson, which designs and sells innovative vacuum cleaners but no longer manufactures
them itself.
The chapter by Bernard and Fort is an important contribution to this book insofar as there exists
little evidence to date about the importance of these kinds of enterprises. The chapter is also particularly timely as beginning in 2017 the US census Bureau will move FGP establishments to manufacturing.
Bernard and Fort estimate that this reclassification of FGPs would have increased the number of manufacturing employees in the USA in 2007 by a minimum of 431,000 to a maximum of 1,934,000, an
increase of between 3 and 14 percent.
While the servitization of firms implies an overly optimistic estimate for manufacturing employment according to Crozet and Milet, the significance of factoryless goods producers suggests the opposite in that many wholesalers are engaging in important aspects of the manufacturing process. Indeed,
according to Baldwin, the highest value-added aspects of manufacturing are captured by these FGPs,
with possible benefits for firm productivity, innovation, and wage compensation.
Using the US Census Bureau Census of Wholesale Trade, Bernard and Fort estimate that FGPs
accounted for 37 percent of these establishments in 2002. Bernard and Fort suggest that “these results
challenge the stereotype of a wholesale establishment that simply intermediates between producer and
consumers. The wholesale sector is a heterogeneous mix of traditional resellers and plants that are
actively involved in production activities.”
The two chapters by Crozet and Milet and Bernard and Fort present contrasting phenomena: manufacturing firms increasingly engage in services – which represents “hidden deindustrialization” – while
part of the observed deindustrialization is due to sourcing and design activities performed by “factoryless goods producers” whose activities were once done within manufacturing. There is indeed no
contradiction here: the boundaries of the firm – and the more so for multinational companies – are
permanently adjusted to focus on core competencies (catering is not a core competence for a car maker,
but designing new software might be). Thus the question is what should be internalized, what can be
performed arms-length (Antras, 2003) and how productivity is shaped this choice (Defever & Toubal,
2013). Making a decision on outsourcing is even more difficult in an international context: in the
presence of incomplete contracts, only the largest and most efficient firms will benefit from offshoring
(Antras & Helpman, 2004). All in all, there is nothing like a one-size-fits-all strategy: different firms,
with different productivity levels, working in industries resorting differently to intangible assets, will
make different choices. Some firms may even be contemplating offshoring, but eventually deciding
against it.
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The next chapter by Lionel Fontagné and D’Isanto focuses explicitly on this critical question of
what to retain within the firm and what to outsource or offshore. The chapter presents results from
the 2012 survey of global value chains in 15 European countries to uncover the main determinants of
international sourcing choices. They focus on a survey of 28,000 firms located in France, with more
than 50 employees at the end of 2008, belonging to industry, trade and non-financial services sectors.
This survey, carried out by INSEE in 2012, is innovative in many aspects. The questionnaire aimed
to uncover the strategic choices made by firms to either perform activities themselves inside the firm,
sourcing in France, or abroad. One may criticize the joint treatment of domestic and offshore sourcing,
but presenting the questionnaire in that way avoided focusing on the always sensitive question of
offshoring. Offshoring of an activity was defined as total or partial transfer of this activity to another
firm located abroad, which may, or not, be part of the parent’s group.
The survey made a useful distinction between core business activity and support business activities
of the respondents. Core business activity is usually the firm’s main activity, while support business
activities are carried out by the firm to allow or facilitate the production of goods or services for the
market or for third parties. Six segments of the value chain were considered beyond the core business of
the surveyed firm: distribution and marketing, sales and after sales services, ICT services, administrative and management functions from legal services or accounting to corporate financial and insurance
services, Research and Development, and a residual category.
Fontagné and D’Isanto identify reasons why leading firms decide to not offshore certain activities,
and tentatively assess the direct consequences for employment of French firms’ offshoring strategies.
The survey covered the decision to offshore over a three-year period between 2009 and 2011. Only 4%
of French firms, representing 6.5% of employees in the firms within the scope of the survey, reported
at least one decision to offshore. An additional 3% of the firms contemplated offshoring, but eventually
decided not to. Firms that chose not to offshore cited as reasons uncertainty about the quality of goods
and services produced in the offshore location, the need for close interaction with clients, or legal and
administrative barriers in the host country and union problems in the home country.
Reasons for offshoring, as reported by respondents, are very much in line with usual predictions
of theories addressing the boundaries of the multinational firms. Distance (a proxy for transaction and
information costs, beyond transport) is an important barrier to offshoring. Also the strategic segments
of the value chain, when offshored, are kept within the firm’s boundaries pointing to the potential for
problems related to incomplete contracts. Offshoring firms are shown to be different: the larger the
firm’s employment, the larger the proportion of firms that offshored parts of their activity. Similarly,
the proportion of firms that offshore is increasing with share of exports in their turnover. For a given
sector, size and firm type, exporters offshored on average four times more often than non-exporting
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firms. Larger firms source to more remote places, where enforcement of contracts can be more difficult,
confirming that in the presence of incomplete contracts, only the largest and most efficient firms will
benefit from offshoring. Finally, firms that offshore are not only bigger, they are also members of
international groups.
Lastly, Fontagné and D’Isanto estimate that 20,000 jobs (or 0.3% of employment in the surveyed
firms in 2011) were offshored between 2009 and 2011. This figure however takes no account of general equilibrium effects, and is not based on a proper counterfactual. This is where surveys, although
very informative on certain decisions (like not offshoring), are intrinsically an incomplete source of
information. Another, less obvious, limitation is worth mentioning: given the design of the survey
performed on behalf of EUROSTAT, the definition of offshoring used excludes situations where relocations of activity abroad goes hand-in-hand with an expansion of the activity at home. Although
defining international sourcing as a substitute to domestic production is restrictive enough to avoid
misinterpretation of the questions by respondents, it neglects more complex strategies where outsourcing and domestic activity are complements. The measure of job losses provided in this chapter must
accordingly be considered as indicative, as it excludes by assumption all offshoring activity that could
be complementary with domestic activity.
Fontagné and D’Isanto provide a transition in this volume from documenting deindustrialization
in the north to measuring the implications for labor markets. The next part of the book shows that
deindustrialization has been accompanied by real costs for industrial country workers. Those costs
take the form of lower demand for less skilled workers, rising inequality, negative effects on real wages
and declining power of unions. It is evident from the papers in this volume that the transition from
industrial to factory free or primarily service economies is painful for many segments of the population.
The chapter by Rosario Crino and Paolo Epifani suggests that large and rising global imbalances–
illustrated by China’s trade surpluses and US trade deficits– have directly led to rising inequality in
industrial countries. They show, using a model which allows for a continium of intermediate trade
goods, that trade deficits in industrial countries and surpluses in lower skilled countries can explain
increases in demand for skill in both regions. In their empirical work, they show using US data that
the results are consistent with their theory. They also rule out other explanations for increasing skill
intensity, such as skill-biased technical change (SBTC).
The model developed by Crino and Epifani builds on the insights of Gordon Hanson and Robert
Feenstra who showed that capital flowing from a skill-intensive northern country to the south could
result in greater inequality in both countries. The intuition comes from the fact that more capital in
the south leads to a fall in the return to capital there, allowing the south to produce a greater set of
skill-intensive goods which can be traded and at the same time narrowing the set of skill-intensive
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goods in which the North has a comparative advantage. Crino and Epifani apply the same intuition to
a trade surplus in the south (and resulting trade deficit in the north) and show that in their model this
also leads to greater demand for skill in both regions.
In their empirical section they present estimates consistent with their theory and take into account
other competing explanations for the rising demand for skill, including the role of offshoring as well
as skill-biased technical change.

They focus on within-industry changes in the US manufacturing

sector, and use as their measure of skill bias the share of non-production workers in value-added at the
disaggregated industry level. They begin by documenting at the aggregate level a positive correlation
between skill upgrading and the trade deficit, which holds strong even after controlling for standard
proxies for offshoring, trade openness and technical change.
Next, using a panel of 380 6-digit US manufacturing industries for the 1977 through 2005 period
they test whether sector-level trade deficits are associated with a systematic within-industry increase
in the relative demand for skills. Consistent with their aggregate results, they find a strong association
between sector level trade deficits and skill upgrading within US industries. They also find that this
effect is statistically larger than the effects of offshoring, trade liberalization and SBTC.

Between 1983 and 2008, United States manufacturing employment declined from 22 to 16 million
workers. After the 2008 financial crisis, the manufacturing sector lost an additional 2 million jobs.
Today, the US employment recovery remains anemic, and millions of Americans of working age are
either unemployed or out of the labor force entirely. In their chapter, Ebenstein, Harrison and McMillan
evaluate claims by critics of globalization that “good” manufacturing jobs have been shipped overseas,
and that China is to blame.
Ebenstein, Harrison, and McMillan identify shortcomings of research that is restricted to analyzing
workers within the manufacturing sector.

The wage effects of import competition on wages is typi-

cally identified by exploiting variation in the prices (or quantities) of imported goods across different
manufacturing industries. Insofar as globalization affects the US labor market by pushing workers
out of manufacturing and into services, a better measure of globalization’s impact is found by focusing
on occupational exposure to globalization, as workers can more easily switch industries than occupations, and so the wage declines will be felt by workers who are forced to leave manufacturing or their
occupation entirely.
In their previous work, Ebenstein, Harrison, and McMillan (2014) presented evidence that an occupationbased analysis is more effective at uncovering the impact on worker wages of global competition. In
this chapter, they extend their previous analysis up to 2008, which allows them to include a period
characterized by rapid increases in offshoring, especially to China.
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Their chapter also disaggregates the impact of geographically distinct sources of offshore employment changes on domestic US wages. In particular, Ebenstein, Harrison, and McMillan measure the
impact of offshore employment by US parents in China, Mexico, India, and other low income locations.
They also compare the effects of import competition from China and offshore employment in China on
US worker wages.
Consistent with their earlier work, they find that offshoring to low wage countries is associated
with wage declines for US workers, and the workers most affected are those performing routine tasks.
Their results indicate that a ten percent increase in occupational exposure to import competition is
associated with a 2.7 percent decline in real wages for workers who perform routine tasks. They also
find substantial wage effects of offshoring to low wage countries: a ten percentage point increase in
occupation-specific exposure to overseas employment in low wage countries is associated with a 0.27
percent decline in real wages for workers performing routine tasks for our entire sample, and nearly a
1 percent decline for 2000-2008.
The downward pressure from trade and offshoring on US wages using occupational (but not industrylevel) measures of globalization explain the puzzling results found by Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013).
David Autor and his co-authors find a positive, but insignificant impact of import competition on local
wages, leading them to conclude that “manufacturing plants react to import competition by accelerating technological and organizational innovations that increase productivity and may raise wages”.
Ebenstein, Harrison, and McMillan in this volume suggest that occupational exposure to globalization
puts significant downward pressure on wages because such a measure captures the movement of workers out of manufacturing and into lower wage services. Using a subset of the CPS data where they are
able to follow the same worker over time, they measure what happens to worker wages when they
switch industries or occupations. They find evidence that while the wage impacts of switches within
manufacturing are mild, leaving manufacturing for services is associated with an appreciable loss in
wages, and larger losses still for workers who are forced to switch occupation upon leaving manufacturing. This highlights the importance of examining the impact of globalization by looking beyond
workers only employed directly in manufacturing.
They then turn to a more in-depth analysis of competition from China, the US’s largest trading partner and second most popular destination for offshoring (after Mexico) in 2008. They present evidence
that both imports from China and offshoring to China are associated with lower US worker wages.
Increasing occupational import penetration from China by a 10 percentage point share of a market is
associated with a 5.6% wage decline, and increasing occupational offshore exposure to China is associated with a further 1.6% decline in wages. They compare for the first time the impact of both import
competition from China and offshore activities by US multinationals in China. The results suggest that
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focusing on imports alone (such as Autor, Dorn, and Hanson do) understates the role of globalization
in contributing to falling US wages.
Lastly, they examine the role played by trade and offshoring in explaining US labor force participation. In the wake of the global financial crisis, the US suffered persistently high rates of unemployment
relative to historical averages, and generational lows in labor force participation rates. Ebenstein, Harrison, and McMillan show that neither offshoring nor international trade are associated with a significant
reduction in labor force participation. Their results indicate that the most important factors associated
with a reduction in US labor force participation during the sample period were computer use rates or
increasing capital intensity, and that offshore activities to China or elsewhere played a very small role.
Francis Kramarz also focuses on the costs to the labor market of increasing international competition. He examines the impact of globalization on the labor market in France. The Single Market
Program (SMP), an attempt to implement the European Community’s internal market, was conceived
in 1985, launched in 1988, with the hope of being achieved around 1992. It entailed decreased tariffs
and barriers within the EC, leading to a rapid increase in import competition in France during the second half of the 1980s. Kramarz addresses two questions in his chapter: with increased competitive
pressures and expanded opportunities due to the SMP, was foreign outsourcing a possible response to
the high wages and strong unions? Second, he asks what was the impact of increased outsourcing on
wages and employment.

Kramarz begins his chapter with a formal theoretical model that shows how the threat of offshoring
forces workers in firms with strong unions to accept a lower share of the profits. Offshoring creates
a threat point that reduces the size of the rent to be shared after bargaining. This pushes firms facing
strong unions to outsource. Through these changes in the quasi-rent, this effect depresses wages. One
important contribution of this chapter is to trace out the mechanism from offshoring to its(negative)
impact on worker wages, which occurs as firms with stronger union activity are able to bargain more
effectively with their workers.
Kramarz is able to use a unique French dataset that has firm level information on outsourcing
decisions, imports, and union strength. He combines that data with matched employer and employee
data that allows him to measure the impact of globalization on wages at the disaggregate level. He uses
the exogenous shock of the SMP to trace out first its effect on the bargaining strength of unions at the
firm level, and consequently the impact on firm level decisions to outsource employment. Outsourcing
and import competition at the firm level in turn affected domestic wages and employment.
Kramarz shows both theoretically and empirically that in France there are essentially two types of
firms, depending on their bargaining regime: firms facing strong unions in which workers capture half
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of the rents and firms facing weaker unions where workers are paid their opportunity wage. Kramarz
first identifies the exercise of union power with firm size, in particular with firms with at least 50
employees. The fifty employee cutoff is associated with the Auroux Laws in France, which stipulate
that bargaining should take place every year in an establishment or a firm with more than 50 employees.
Kramarz then goes beyond the firm size cutoff and uses firm level information on union activity to
confirm the extent of union strength.
Kramarz finds that large firms decrease employment when their offshoring increases. At the same
time, rent sharing declines.

In terms of magnitudes, he finds that a ten percentage point increase

in the share of offshoring in sales is associated with a 1.3 percentage point decrease in employment.
Kramarz concludes that firms facing strong unions increased offshoring and decreased employment
while other firms increased relative employment and used outsourcing much less intensively. As he
points out,“Union strength may well have backfire”.
Fiorini, Jansen and Xsie summarize the trends documented in the first nine chapters of this book,
documenting increasing globalization, structural change in all economies, and employment losses in
manufacturing. One issue that remains unresolved is the relative importance of offshoring, labor saving technological change and finally the natural shift of economies towards services in explaining these
global trends. These shifts are not independent: offshoring is one consequence of the shifting comparative advantage of industrialized economies, and technical change is partly a response to competition
from low-wage countries. If structural change observed in industrialized countries goes hand-in-hand
with offshoring, it should also have a mirror image: structural change in the developing world. This is
the global and complex picture addressed in this chapter.
Fiorini, Jansen and Xsie take a comprehensive view of structural change by comparing and contrasting trends in both developing and industrialized countries. Two questions are the focus of the
research presented in their chapter: (1) has structural change accelerated in recent years, and (2) has
the movement of factories to the developing world been systematic and global?
On the first question, focusing in particular on the relative role of the manufacturing sector in the
U.S., the chapter suggests that changes in recent years are not dramatic. The decline in the manufacturing employment has been constant over the past three decades. A somewhat different picture arises in
terms of value added, as a result of changes in relative prices and productivity differentials: the sector’s
role in terms of (the volume of) value added declined less than employment.
On the second question, in most industrialized countries, the decline of the manufacturing sector
has occurred in conjunction with increased imports from the developing world, suggesting causality
between the two. However, changes observed in the sectoral composition of economic activity are
far more complex than what would be expected from this pure offshoring story. Interestingly, even
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China, the so called “world’s factory” has experienced a decline in the relative weight of manufacturing
employment in the 1990s, while Japan, Germany and Korea, instead, went through significant labor
shedding in manufacturing in the 1990s and now have trade surpluses with China. Such structural
transformation in China suggests that the gradual decline in employment shares of manufacturing
cannot be attributed primarily to emerging market competition but are part of a global and perhaps
universal process of structural transformation.
In light of this inconclusive prima facie evidence, Fiorini, Jansen and Xsie seek to properly measure
structural change. They use their Structural Change Index, which reflects the share of a given economy
that has shifted sectoral allocation over a certain period of time. This index does not indicate the
direction of change (it does not say whether economic activity has moved away from manufacturing
towards services or vice versa) but the intensity of change. Interestingly, this measure can easily be
compared across countries. It can be calculated using sectoral value added data, and using employment
data as well.
Structural change in terms of value added has not accelerated over the past three decades for the
United States, whereas it has in terms of employment. This acceleration does not necessarily hold for
other developed countries and one should refrain from drawing general conclusions based on the US
example only.
Finally, one would like to correlate growth and structural change, but no general pattern arises.
In most advanced economies, the values of the structural change index are comparable across decades
while decade level growth rates have declined. In Asia, growth rates have remained relatively stable
across the decades, while most of the reshuffling took place in the 1980s. Finally, for Latin America there
may be a negative relationship between growth and structural change. All in all, the evidence suggests
no clear link between growth and structural change. The lack of systematic evidence is confirmed by
an econometric exercise in which the structural change index is regressed over periods and regions,
controlling for income and finally economic growth. Structural change can take place in a context of
positive, no or negative growth.
These inconclusive findings, which refute the popular view of a direct relationship between growth
in developing countries and deindustrialization in the developed world, lead Fiorini, Jansen and Xsie to
conclude that structural change is not automatically associated with productivity increases or growth.
Episodes of large structural changes in economies at different level of development not necessarily coincide. Microeconomic evidence, ideally using matched employer employee data, is needed to precisely
assess what are the ultimate consequences of offshoring and deindustrialization on the labor market.
The last chapter of the volume is by Philippe Martin, Thierry Mayer, and Florian Mayneris. They
explore why some firms were able to weather the 2008-2009 crisis better. In particular, they focus on
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the role of cluster policies in allowing some exporters to survive the collapse of international trade in
2009 better than others. This focus on cluster policies also allows these authors to address the policy
challenges of deindustrialization and worker dislocation which is a theme of this entire book.
They are specifically interested in French cluster policies, the “pôles de compétitivité (competitiveness clusters)” policy, which was launched in 2005. Their results show that the agglomeration of
exporters positively affects the survival probability of firms on export markets, and conditioning on
survival, the growth rate of their exports. However, these spillover effects were not stronger during the
crisis; if anything, the opposite is true. They then show that this weaker resilience of firms in clusters
is probably due to the fact that firms in clusters are more dependent on the fate of the largest exporter
in the cluster.
As Martin and his co-authors point out, “clusters are popular among policy makers. There are
good reasons for this: geographical concentration of firms operating in the same industry has been
extensively shown to favor firm-level economic performance.” The chapter points out that previous
literature shows modest gains from public policies that provide incentives for more clustering. This is
because agglomeration gains are already partly internalized by firms in their location choices.
Philippe Martin and his co-authors fill the gap in the business cycle literature by investigating
whether firms in clusters resist better to economic shocks than others. They highlight an interesting
feature of clusters that had been ignored so far: by reinforcing the relationships and the interdependencies between firms, clusters might amplify the transmission of shocks, and thus increase the volatility
of the activity at the local level. Policy makers interested in promoting clusters need to bear it in mind
when evaluating the costs and benefits of of implementing a cluster policy.
This book addresses the new role for technology, which makes it possible to handle complexity and
to exchange an unprecedented amount of information on a global scale instantaneously. Recent developments in the literature on global value chains (see Baldwin, this volume) give a better understanding
as to what extent trade in intermediate goods changes the overall picture of traded value added. Such
changes may lead researchers to compute adjusted revealed comparative advantage indicators (Koopman, Wang & Wei, 2014).
Choices made by firms clearly affect their total employment, conditional on the complementarity or
substitutability of the offshored tasks. But beyond the volume of hours worked, choices regarding the
boundaries of the firm affect the nature of tasks performed within the firm. In a factory free economy,
the content of tasks performed in the industrial sector has little to do with the physical transformation
of materials into products. The two main activities are designing new products, or new bundles of
products and services (Iphone and Itunes), and supervising the global value and logistic chains leading
to the physical product delivered to the final consumer. Most of the tasks are about R&D, and treatment
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of complex batches of information. Associated tasks being skill-intensive, the skill content of tasks
performed within the factory free company is different.
We know since Feenstra and Hanson (1996) that the vertical fragmentation of production at the
international level contributed to rising wage inequalities in the United States. What is different in the
case of “factory-China” is the size of the country where physical production activities are offshored. In
such a case, trade imbalances (only partially compensated by services income, e.g. royalties) may well
reinforce the mechanisms at stake on industrial country labor markets. International trade is no longer
about products, but tasks (Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). Low-wage countries tend to specialize
in offshorable tasks, while advanced countries specialize in the less offshorable segments of sequential
value chains handling complexity, while unskilled non-offshorable tasks may be maintained as well.
The new international division of labour within the factory-free company accordingly imposes a
different approach when analysing the impact of globalization on the labour market. The question
becomes whether a worker’s occupation can be performed more cheaply and reliably in a low-wage
economy. Reorganization of production on a global scale has led to the reallocation of workers away
from high wage manufacturing jobs into other sectors or other occupations within industry. Trade in
tasks can affect a wider class of workers than those directly affected to handling physical products.
Displaced workers will face a reduction in their earnings, as they shift industries (even from manufacturing to services) but continue performing tasks that are routine and offshorable. Indeed, Kramarz
in this volume shows that unions can paradoxically reinforce the desirability of offshoring for firms
confronted by competition, but could also limit the ultimate recourse to offshoring as well.
If the distinction between industry and services is no longer relevant, if tasks performed are the
relevant prism to analyze transformations in the labour market, and if cities are the twenty first century
“factories”, how should public policies adjust? One dimension is that public policies should target
individuals, rather than industries (manufacturing or services), when addressing employment issues.
The other dimension is about the promotion of cities. How do we interpret the evidence presented
in the last chapter of this book that productivity gains are associated with clusters? Denser areas are
more productive. This can be due to selection, as only the most productive firms can survive in more
competitive environments. This can also be due to agglomeration economies, associated with a better
access to a variety of inputs, or the circulation of ideas (Duranton& Puga, 2004). If such difference in
efficiency of big cities is mainly the outcome of a selection issue, and if firms internalize agglomeration
economies in their location decisions, the gains to be expected from policies reinforcing clustering
might be limited. Fortunately, selection is only part of the answer. The comparison of the empirical
firm productivity distribution across high and low density locations confirms that there is a substantial
efficiency premium associated with city size, even higher for highly productive firms (Combes et al.,
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2012). Fontagné & Santoni (2015) explain this outcome in terms of firm optimization in terms of hiring
and displacing inputs. Resource misallocation and the associated effect on productivity is not only
related to firms characteristics but also to the environment in which firms operate. Denser locations
offer a better match between employers and employees, hence higher overall productivity, beyond
individual firm characteristics.
This book presents contributions from leading researchers studying the process of deindustrialization. These researchers, based in Europe and the United States, present a daunting picture of a new,
factory free world. Richard Baldwin begins the volume with a broad sweep of history showing that
deindustrialization is happening in all the industrial countries. Jean Imbs reinforces the picture. Our
authors then show that the macro level trends away from manufacturing are reinforced by micro firm
data for Japan, the United States, and countries in Europe.
The chapters by Richard Baldwin, Jean Imbs, and Fiorini, Jansen and Xsie all concur that structural
transformation towards a factory free economy has been happening in industrial countries for many
decades. The evidence in this book suggests that deindustrialization is a process that happens over
time in all countries, even China today. One implication is that the current vogue of China-bashing is
not likely to provide a solution to these long term trends. Another implication is that the distinction
between manufacturing and services is likely to become increasingly blurry. More manufacturing firms
are engaging in services activities, and more wholesale firms are engaging in services. One optimistic
perspective suggests that industrial country firms may be able to exploit the high-value added and skill
intensive activities associated with design and innovation, as well as distribution, all components of the
global value chain for manufacturing.
A less optimistic picture emerges when we turn to an evaluation of the impact of these trends on
industrial country labor markets. While international economists for many years downplayed the transitional costs associated with structural changes, it is increasingly evident that globalization imposes
significant adjustment costs. Those costs are borne disproportionately by less skilled workers. One of
the great challenges of the twenty first century will be how to improve the lives and opportunities for
those left behind.
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